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11 Contingent Narratives: Fears 
and Tremblings 
  DAVID HILES 
 
 
 
All knowledge about reality is possibility. (Søren Kierkegaard) 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Two brief studies are presented concerned with narrative thinking in relation to 
unpredicted immediate experience – ie. with what I call contingent narratives. 
The first study is a heuristic inquiry into the experience of travel/motion fear, 
and the second study is concerned with experiential accounts of an earthquake 
that occurred in Leicestershire in October 2001. The data were examined 
within the framework of Bruner’s (1996) “nine universals of narrative 
realities”. The striking feature that emerges from both of these studies is the 
way in which someone will immediately engage with “narrativizing” the event 
in question. A model of the narrative construction of reality is discussed, which 
proposes that contingent narratives are a dominant feature of everyday lived 
experience, and consequently quickly become embedded into our memory of 
events. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Jerome Bruner (1996, p.149) has pointed out that “… we live most of our lives 
in a world constructed according to the roles and devices of narrative”. It is this 
basic idea that is the main focus of this paper, ie. that we do not simply 
communicate in narratives but that we live in narratives, we think in narratives, 
and that our immediate experience of a world around us is constructed in 
narratives. Bruner has made this theoretical claim repeatedly. For example, “… 
the typical form of framing experience (and our memory of it) is in narrative 
form” (Bruner, 1990, p.56), and “… we organize our experience and our 
memory of human happenings mainly in the form of narrative” (Bruner, 1991, 
p.4). Donald Polkinghorne has also expressed the same idea: “… narrative 
meaning is a cognitive process that organizes human experiences into 
temporally meaningful episodes [. but] narrative meaning is not an object 
available to direct observation” (Polkinghorne, 1988, p.1). 
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 While this idea that narrative offers a mode of thinking for shaping our 
experience of the real world is clearly a very important claim, there is a need to 
proceed with some caution. It is a claim that has been made mostly by 
argument, and, so far at least, has not been supported by empirical evidence. 
How might it be possible to make narrative thinking open to more direct 
observation? 
 To begin with, I think it is helpful to distinguish between discursive and 
contingent narratives. By contingent narratives, I mean the stories that we 
generate, consciously or unconsciously, in order to organize our immediate 
experience of events. These are the building blocks of a narrative mode of 
thinking that is fundamental to our construction of reality. They can make the 
all too familiar strange and unpredictable, and can turn the unfamiliar and 
unexpected into phenomenologically understandable experiences. Such 
narratives prefigure our memory of events, and are the basis for later shared 
discursive accounts. With a slight difference in emphasis, this notion of 
contingent narratives is very similar to David Boje’s notion of antenarratives 
(Boje, 2001), and to Daniel Stern’s notion of the “present moment” as a lived 
story (Stern, 2004). 
 Despite Polkinghorne’s doubts above, and Bruner’s warning that “narrative 
realities … are too ubiquitous, their construction too habitual or automatic to 
be accessible to easy inspection” (Bruner, 1996, p.147), we will explore the 
empirical evidence for contingent narratives in two brief studies. 
 
 
Study 1: Fears 
 
The first study involves a phenomenological/heuristic inquiry into the 
experience of travel/motion fear. 
 
Procedure 
 
Heuristic inquiry (Douglass and Moustakas, 1985; Moustakas, 1990) is an 
adaptation of phenomenological inquiry but explicitly acknowledges the 
involvement of the researcher, to the extent that the lived experience of the 
researcher becomes the main focus of the research. This approach to research is 
similar to the idea of lived inquiry developed by John Heron (1998), and 
mindful inquiry developed by Bentz and Shapiro (1998). What is explicitly the 
focus of the approach is the transformative effect of the inquiry on the 
researcher’s own experience. This is often achieved by a process that I think 
can usefully be called discernment. Moustakas identifies seven basic phases 
involved in this approach: initial engagement, immersion, incubation, 
illumination, explication, creative synthesis and validation of the heuristic 
research (Hiles, 2001). 
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 There is clearly more involved in heuristic inquiry than the researcher 
simply analyzing their own experience. What Moustakas outlines is the much 
wider context within which the researcher engages with the research question, 
examines their own experience amongst a number of other explorations, and 
follows this through with an awareness of the transformative processes at work 
in the research enterprise. 
 I am therefore both the researcher and the participant for this study. This 
was unplanned, the experience simply happened to me, but was so remarkable 
that I felt it worth making a study of in some detail. My approach was at the 
first opportunity to write down a full account of my experience, and then keep 
a diary of my thoughts, reflections and related experiences. I began by 
immersing myself in the original experience, so that eventually, explication of 
this research appears as the creative synthesis in the form of this brief report. 
 
Findings 
 
Cyprus – The precipitating experience occurred during a coach excursion, 
with my wife, into the central mountains region of the island, in April 1997. 
After a few minutes on the narrow and winding mountainous roads, I began to 
feel nauseous, overwhelmed by anxiety and fear. I told my wife, and 
desperately wanted to stop the coach. Trying to cope with these feelings, I 
thought of several possible explanations, and then began to notice that the 
anxiety was particularly intense when the coach was turning to the right, and 
not when turning to the left. With each turn of the coach, now to the left, now 
to the right, I was able to confirm this surprising observation. Gradually, I 
began to realize that this replicated almost the same situation I had experienced 
in India, when I was 18, some 30 years before. A coach that I was travelling on 
then, in a mountainous area of Assam, turning to the right, had almost skidded 
off the road, down a 100ft ravine. I had been no more than two or three inches 
from being killed. 
 Connecting these two events, 30 years apart, a story began to emerge in my 
mind that it was not the current driving that was causing me distress, but with 
each turn to the right my body was “remembering” my original experience in 
India. As I became aware of this story, my anxiety noticeably subsided, and 
became quite manageable. 
 I have subsequently replicated this experience several times over the past 
few years. For example, during a visit to Alaska, in 1998, the same but 
unexpected feelings of anxiety and fear overwhelmed me during a short coastal 
tour, although this time the feelings were recognized and quickly brought 
under control. During a visit to north Devon, in 2002, I consciously choose to 
be the passenger during a car drive along the coastal road in order to further 
test my observations of this experience. I have subsequently confirmed that the 
feelings are quite specific to: 
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• being driven (ie. not when being the driver, not sailing, not flying, etc) 
• winding roads (ie. mountainous/coastal terrain) 
• going downwards, not upwards 
• turning to the right, with a sheer drop to the left 
• the anxiety feelings are prior to recognition, etc. 
 
Summary 
 
I call this story a contingent narrative, since it is a formulation contingent on 
the immediate events (albeit mediated through a period of reflection). It is a 
story that enabled me to reinterpret my experience of the situation in which I 
found myself. In conclusion, this brief study highlights how a contingent 
narrative has a sense-making function, and in this particular case, has a 
significant transformative effect. Also, the story is now available for me to use 
as soon as the anxieties feelings are recognizable. 
 
 
Study 2: Tremblings 
 
The second study examines the accounts of a rather unusual experience for 
people who live in the city where I live, an earthquake that registered 3.8 on 
the Richter Scale. 
 On Sunday, 28th October 2001, during the afternoon there was an 
earthquake very close to Leicester. I did not experience this myself, I was more 
than 100 miles away, but was phoned by my daughter, who said that she had 
felt the house shake. I am still rather embarrassed to admit that I discounted 
any other explanation that my daughter offered, and suggested that this was 
probably a problem with our heating boiler. That it had been an earthquake was 
later confirmed on the radio. On talking later to a few people, I noticed how 
different each person’s experience had been, and thought it would be 
interesting to gather the accounts of others who had experienced what was an 
unusual event. 
 
Procedure 
 
I wanted to collect the data as quickly, and from as many people, as possible, 
and decided that trying to interview people individually or in groups was 
impractical. For expediency, I set up an internet-based bulletin board and asked 
people to spread the word that I was looking for replies to the following 
request: 
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I am interested in collecting some accounts of people’s experiences of the 
earthquake in the East Midlands last Sunday. I am particularly interested in: (i) 
Your account of the experience. (ii) Did you realise it was an earthquake? (iii) If 
not, what did you think it was? (iv) Did you learn later that it was an earthquake? 
If so, when and how? (v) Have you ever experienced an earthquake before? 
 
Findings 
 
There were 32 contributions made to the bulletin board. The data clearly 
confirmed the wide range of different ways that people used to explain their 
experience of the earthquake, but the point of interest here is that these 
explanations are invariably expressed as contingent narratives, ie. as stories 
that participants generated in order to organize their immediate experience of 
the event. For example, a typical response was: 
 
P1: I felt the earthquake on Sunday. I was at my boyfriend’s parents’ house, and I 
felt the settee shake. My boyfriend’s mum felt the door hit the back of her 
chair, it felt as though the whole house had shook. We thought that something 
had happened next door! Maybe something had blown up! We went round to 
next door, who were also wondering what had happened. There was an old 
man wondering around the street, I think he thought he was going mad. 
 
From the accounts collected, it was almost always quite clear whether 
participants were alone when they experienced the earthquake, or were 
together with someone else. I therefore decided to separate these accounts into 
two groupings. The following are examples taken from the accounts of those 
who experienced the earthquake alone: 
 
P3: The room started shaking as I was standing in front of my shelf and I was 
certain that it was a car on the drive. 
 
P4: I thought at first a car had run into the house. 
 
P5: Immediately I thought the backdoor had slammed shut, but on investigation I 
realized this had not been possible and put it down to a large truck passing 
by, as I live near to a main road. 
 
P8: I presumed that it must have been a bomb and that we were finally under 
attack, due to the war on terror. 
 
P10: I immediately thought earthquake? Since I had experienced one before when 
living in North Wales. 
 
P13: I remember thinking at first that it was a large lorry driving by. 
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These are examples taken from the accounts of those who experienced the 
earthquake in the company of someone else: 
 
P6: We were in the cinema in Melton Mowbary. I felt a sensation as if a very 
large vehicle had run at speed into the building. 
 
P9: The first thing dad said was that it must have been an earthquake and so I 
believed him. 
 
P12: I was at home with my housemates. I felt my desk vibrate and more or less 
dismissed it … my friend thought it was a problem with the boiler, and I 
thought it was a train going past! 
 
P15: I was at work … we were on the ground floor, and to begin with I thought it 
was something moving a visual aid on the first floor … I went across to 
security, I could hear customers talking – most of them thought it was some 
kind of attack by the Taliban, and to be totally honest, I thought it was 
something to do with the American bombings. 
 
P27: The girl I was with initially thought it was somebody trying to break into the 
cash point which is situated at the side of the building where we were stood. 
 
Summary 
 
There is no obvious difference between participants being alone or being 
together with someone else, except that they may well be at home rather than 
out in a public place. Of course, the fact that the earthquake happened just a 
few weeks after 9/11 is significant, and widens the range of possibilities that 
participants draw upon. 
 What is the most striking feature of these accounts is the way in which 
people report that they immediately engaged with “narrativizing” an event such 
as this. Clearly these are examples of what I call “contingent narratives”, since 
they are narratives produced in order to make sense of something that is 
happening or has just happened. Shaking houses, moving shelves and wobbling 
rooms are narrativized as faulty boilers, cars driving into buildings, passing 
lorries, terrorist bombs, noisy neighbours, someone upstairs, or a raid on a cash 
point machine! People quickly draw upon local knowledge, plausible events, 
and ongoing concerns and fears to generate their contingent account. As in 
Study 1, here the contingent narratives have a sense-making function – the 
unexpected is made understandable. 
 
 
Discussion 
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I want to claim that these two studies offer good empirical support for a 
narrative mode of thought, but I think it is quite reasonable to ask, why do I 
characterize the data collected in these studies as narratives? This is not a 
simple question to answer, but I have given it much thought, and I think it is 
best answered by considering the defining properties of narrative. For example, 
Bruner (1996, p.133-147) has set out nine universals of narrative realities: 
 
• a structure of committed time 
• generic particularity 
• actions have reasons 
• hermeneutic composition 
• implied canonicity 
• ambiguity of reference 
• the centrality of trouble 
• inherent negotiability 
• the historical extensibility of narrative. 
 
 There is not the space here to discuss this in detail, but I am satisfied that 
the experiential accounts from Study 1 and Study 2, meet the criteria of each of 
these universals outlined by Bruner. Thus, from the universal of committed 
time, where narratives are seen to segment time, not by the clock, but by 
unfolding crucial events, to the universal of historical extensibility, where 
narratives are seen to build on each other and chain with each other, it seems 
clear that we are dealing with narrative data. 
 
 
 Narrative, Memory and Everyday Life 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
114 
Figure 1 Model of the Narrative Construction of Reality 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 A further issue that this research raises is the crucial distinction that must 
be made between contingent and discursive narrative practices. Narrative offers 
a mode of thinking for construing the immediate experience of “reality”, as 
well as a mode for discursively sharing self-experiences with others. In Figure 
1, I have proposed a simplified model of narrative thinking that may help to 
make this distinction clearer. The focus in the current paper has been on just 
the inter-relationship between contingent narratives and experience, however, 
the model also incorporates the wider part played by discursively shared 
accounts and the dominant narratives that also circulate. 
 Of course, the data collected in both Study 1 and 2 are discursive 
reconstructions of the original experience, recorded in either a diary or written 
into a bulletin board. Nevertheless, I think it is reasonable to take these 
reconstructions at their face value, as ample evidence that people think in 
narratives, as well as tell of their experience in narratives. While I have much 
sympathy with Jerome Bruner when he points out how difficult it might be “… 
to distinguish sharply what is a narrative mode of thought and what is a text or 
discourse” (Bruner, 1996, p.132), I do tend to follow Daniel Stern when he 
says: 
 
… one can not get to the lived experience and stay there while talking about it. 
But that does not stop me from thinking about it and approaching as close as I can.  
 (Stern, 2004, p.xiii) 
 
 
Contingent 
Narratives 
Experience 
Dominant 
Narratives 
“Event” Discursive Accounts 
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Conclusions 
 
Contingent narratives are a dominant feature of everyday lived experience, 
they can be the basis for immediate action, and as the opportunity arises these 
narratives will readily be shared with others. The events experienced in both 
Study 1 and 2 were unexpected. This is by no means a defining feature of 
contingent narratives, but only served to highlight them in operation. We of 
course narrativize predictable and unpredictable events, continuously, in our 
every waking moment. 
 I also want to stress that contingent narratives are inherently participatory. 
Thus, we participate in our own meaning making (this is particularly relevant 
to the role of narrative in the construction of self, in counselling and 
psychotherapy, etc. – cf. Polkinghorne, 1988; Mair, 1989; Kerby, 1991; 
Bruner, 2002). Such narratives can have a powerful transformative effect on 
personal experience. 
 Of course, the narratives of others can be particularly persuasive. 
Inevitably, the authoritative narratives of radio and TV bulletins will compete 
for dominance in our understanding of “events”. But, eventually, our 
contingent narratives become embedded into our memory of events, and the 
different tellings of our story. 
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